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Social Traps and Social Trust in a Devastated Urban Community
Michael A. Cowan
A “social trap” is a situation where individuals, groups or organizations are unable to cooperate
owing to mutual mistrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all. . .
People will cooperate only if they can trust that others will also cooperate.
—Bo Rothstein, Social Traps and the Problem of Trust
If people cannot trust that public officials will act according to norms such as impartiality,
objectivity, incorruptibility, and non-discrimination they cannot trust “people in general” either. .
. . If it proves that I cannot trust the local police, judges, teachers and doctors, then whom in this
society can I trust?
—Rothstein, Social Traps

The last national survey of adult literacy prior to Hurricane Katrina found 40 percent of New
Orleans adults reading at or below the sixth-grade level and another 30 percent at or below the
eighth-grade level. During the three years before the hurricane, New Orleanians watched as public
meetings of its elected school board became models of incivility, where the politically connected
struggled for control of contracts and patronage and self-appointed activists ridiculed school
officials, board members, and fellow citizens who were attempting to raise the performance of the
city’s public schools out of the ranks of the nation’s worst. During this same period, neither citizens
nor public officials were able to address the deplorable condition of the city’s once nationally
acclaimed youth recreation department, even as homicidal youth violence escalated, putting New
Orleans consistently at or near the top of national per capita murder rates. In short, the adults of
the city proved unable to provide adequate public education and recreation for children and young
adults. Their failure resulted in violence, economic despair, and deepening racial division.
Shortly after his election as a pro-business, reform candidate in 2002, Mayor C. Ray Nagin
was denounced at a press conference of clergy by one of the city’s most visible ministers as a
“white man in black skin.” What had the new mayor done to so offend this powerful, politically
connected minister and his colleagues? He had announced that under his administration, local
congregations seeking federal grants distributed through the City of New Orleans for after-school
programs for children and other social ministries would be required to secure that funding by
responding to public requests for proposals and to give a formal accounting at the end of the grant
period of how funds awarded were actually disbursed and with what results. This was hardly a
radical policy. Rather it was and is the standard way of disbursing and accounting for public
dollars. A member of mayor’s inner circle described this public denunciation, widely reported and
replayed by local media, as having had a “chilling” impact on the new, reform-minded mayor, one
from which he never fully recovered.
On the evening of December 31, 2004, eight months before the hurricane that would change
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football tournament was pinned on the ground by three white bouncers in a confrontation outside
a French Quarter bar. He never arose. Levon Jones was suffocated on Bourbon Street that night.
On a cold and rainy Thursday evening some weeks later, at Mayor Nagin’s request, I chaired a
public meeting of the Human Relations Commission of the City of New Orleans in a packed city
council chambers. During the meeting, the commission listened for more than three hours to
expressions of public outrage and grief sparked by the killing and by the history of the New Orleans
Police Department’s treatment of African Americans over many years. Threats of racial riots to
destroy “this plantation” once and for all were sprinkled throughout the public testimony.
As the atmospheric disturbance that would soon be christened “Katrina” formed over West
Africa, she was not the only storm on the New Orleans horizon.

Immediate Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina grazed the mandatorily evacuated city of New Orleans,
reserving its most devastating force for coastal Mississippi just to the east. During the next two
days, the federal levees, the wall between us and the water all around us, failed in multiple places.
Eighty percent of the residences and businesses in the city went underwater. An estimated 1,833
people died in the metropolitan area. The average cost of a US hurricane is about $20 billion; the
cost of Katrina was $165 billion. Public officials warned residents and business owners that they
might be unable to return for months. The scope of devastation in certain parts of the city made
returning questionable indefinitely for many. Failures of coordination among local, state, and
federal governments added to the collective misery, confusion, and uncertainty about the city’s
future.
In the hurricane’s wake, new hopes and old grievances shifted in uncertain balance, as the
sense of a historic opportunity to build a better city for all clashed with people’s anxiety about
losing whatever political and economic advantage they held before the storm. The profound
disruption of local politics, religion, and economics resulting from massive flooding temporarily
created a less racially charged atmosphere that would provide an opening for and provoke a contest
about enhancing the well-being of the whole city through its rebuilding. For a moment, local civic,
religious, and business leaders organizing for change across formerly impenetrable barriers of race
and class did not face the massive political inertia and resistance that had met all such efforts before
the storm. With those forces reduced, leaders could work together across racial lines for the wellbeing of the city with a measure of hope. Organizing for change in the wake of Hurricane Katrina
was like walking on the moon.

A Disaster Gives Birth to a Transformation
Among the important post-Katrina reforms was the establishment of an office to reduce waste,
fraud, and abuse of power in city government. It was a play in five acts: a recommendation from
the mayoral commission established to bring New Orleans back after the hurricane; passage by
city council members of an ordinance establishing an inspector general’s office; approval by
citizens of a charter change to protect the independence of the new office; the hiring of the
founding inspector general; and the beginning of the work of the Office of Inspector General. (The
“prequel” to this story may be found in David Marcello’s contribution to this issue.)
Act 1: Bring New Orleans Back Commission
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In November 2005, Mayor Nagin established the Bring New Orleans Back Commission, charging
it to present him with recommendations on a number of critical dimensions of the rebuilding of
the city by the end of January 2006. The commission consisted of working committees made up
of civic, business, religious, and higher education leaders addressing culture, land use, public
safety, infrastructure, city government, public education, economic development, and health and
social services.
Gary Solomon chaired the commission’s Government Efficiency and Effectiveness
Committee, which I organized. The mission of the committee was to improve local government as
one response to the challenges and opportunities of post-Katrina New Orleans, to foster city
government that is effective, efficient, transparent, and adequately and fairly funded. The
committee’s plan was to pick priority targets for change, identify examples of such changes already
implemented in other cities, specify the steps necessary to put such proven practices in place
locally, and establish a timeline for taking those steps. The committee’s agenda was to build trust
in city government by achieving transparency: no more deals behind closed doors.
In the temporary reduction of racial inertia caused by extreme political and economic
disorganization immediately following Katrina, the guiding idea of committee members was that
New Orleanians now had an opportunity not simply to replace what had been lost or damaged in
the flood but to recreate city government for the greater benefit of all by fundamentally reforming
its structures, policies, and operations. Our intent was sharpened by the observation of the
committee’s expert adviser, former mayor Steven Goldsmith, that local government’s principal
function is to assure businesses and citizens that the city’s future merits their investment. What
makes businesses and residents feel that a city’s future warrants their ongoing tax dollars? Simply
put, local government providing its services lawfully, fairly, and with limited waste—a concern of
businesses and citizens everywhere. Waste, fraud, and abuse have been destroying cities and
nations forever. Read any report on nations facing social disaster, and the word “corruption” will
quickly appear.
The post-Katrina emphasis on reforming city government was further energized by the keen
recognition that if local leaders were not able to begin moving against New Orleans’s legendary
and habitual practices of patronage, waste, and corruption, the massive public and philanthropic
funding available and necessary for the renaissance of the city could be withheld or rigidly
controlled.
A review of national best practices to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in government provided
to the committee by the research team of the Kennedy School of Government suggested that an
independent office of inspector general was the most powerful mechanism available to promote
government transparency and accountability. C. Daniel Karnes, the committee’s legal researcher,
quickly discovered that the New Orleans city charter had mandated the establishment of an office
of inspector general (OIG) in 1995, but an independent office had never been established. The
significance of this finding was that “all” it would take to establish this key reform was an
ordinance passed by city council. By contrast, another important post-Katrina reform of local
government, the consolidation of seven local tax assessors into one, required a statewide majority
vote to change the Louisiana constitution. This reform was also successful, but it was a much more
costly undertaking involving, among other expenses, statewide television and radio ads. Such
heavier lifts would not be immediately required to establish an OIG. Partly because of its strategic
significance for reform at this critical moment in the life of the city and partly because the city
charter already required its establishment, the Government Efficiency and Effectiveness
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Committee prioritized establishing an OIG in its recommendations delivered to the mayor in a
plenary public meeting of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission in January 2006.
Act 2: Establishing the Office of Inspector General
Campaigning for the first local elections for mayor and city council following Katrina began just
as the Government Efficiency and Effectiveness Committee made public its priority
recommendation to establish an OIG. The storm’s displacement of people registered to vote in
New Orleans would make this the most highly charged election in New Orleans since the civil
rights era. Thousands returned by bus and car from what many hoped would be temporary locations
to cast their votes. It was a time of despair, anger, and confusion about the future.
The campaign included a public conversation, framed most unfortunately by Mayor Nagin,
about the importance of New Orleans’ remaining a “chocolate city.” Several reform-minded city
council candidates, drawn to public service in the wake of Katrina, made establishment of the OIG
a priority plank in their campaign platforms.
When the votes were counted, three newly elected members of the seven-member city council
were fully in support of creating the OIG. A fourth was open in principle, if proper checks on the
power of the office could be put in place. At a critical juncture in the city’s history, New Orleanians
had elected a majority reform-minded city council willing to embrace serious transformation of
city government.
Making the establishment of the OIG a priority for post-Katrina reform became the basis for
two significant social partnerships of government, business, and civic leaders—one to establish
the OIG in local ordinance, the other to offer it constitutional protection from politics by amending
the city charter.
Encouraged and supported by civic leaders, newly elected city council member Shelley
Midura took the initiative to prepare an ordinance establishing an OIG for council consideration.
She and her staff sought technical assistance from the national Association of Inspectors General.
In fall 2006, the city council deliberated publicly on an ordinance recommended by the
Government Affairs Committee to establish an OIG as required by city charter. During these
deliberations in a public meeting of the council, the proposed OIG was first publicly labeled a
“white power grab,” that is, an attempt by whites to accomplish by ordinance what they could not
get at the ballot box—control over black government officials. Following several hours of intense
public testimony and council deliberation, the committee passed the establishing ordinance after
adding an amendment providing for an oversight committee to review OIG performance annually
against its annual work plan.
Act 3: Changing the City Charter to Protect the Independence of the Office of the
Inspector General
The city council members and citizen advocates who had collaborated successfully to pass the OIG
ordinance and secure funding for its first year of operation were aware that every year a mayor
could recommend, and a city council approve, reducing funding for the office in the annual city
budget. The OIG’s effectiveness and sustainability depended not just on its capabilities and
accomplishments but also on protecting it from continually shifting partisan political and
patronage interests. This protection would require a funding mechanism not subject to annual
approval or adjustment by the mayor or city council.
Toward that end, citizen leaders worked with reform-oriented city council members to
formulate an amendment to the city charter that, if approved by a majority of voters, would set
4
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aside .075 percent of the city’s annual operating budget to fund the OIG and an Ethics Review
Board. That formula would have amounted to $250,000 a year. As the city’s annual operating
budget goes up or down, the OIG budget follows.
The charter change proposal also included a provision negotiated by council members for the
establishment of an office of independent police monitor (IPM) within the OIG. The inclusion of
the IPM in the OIG made it timely for the local justice activist Norris Henderson and me to convene
an interracial alliance of citizen groups to support the charter-change vote. It brought together
organizations willing to support the police monitor but passionately committed to the OIG, others
willing to support the OIG primarily because it would include an IPM, and some backing both. In
community-based organizing, as in other social efforts, people can work for the same goal (here,
a change to the city charter) with different motivations.
Our intention was to deliver a strong vote for the OIG/IPM to organize a multiracial charterchange alliance that also crossed lines of class and city geography. When the votes were cast in
October 2008, 77 percent of voters supported the proposed charter change, with positive margins
in all demographic subgroups. A more typical margin in New Orleans elections would be 65 to 35
percent. This result meant that adequate and predictable annual funding tied to the city’s yearly
operating budget was guaranteed for the OIG and the IPM. As an additional benefit, the OIG’s
hard-won independence could provide political cover for the IPM. Only another majority vote of
local citizens for a charter change could undo the offices or reduce their funding. The office’s
citizen, business, and government advocates had provided the OIG with the maximum degree of
independence possible in a local democracy, while simultaneously creating the city’s first
independent entity to oversee police misbehavior.
The process of establishing and protecting the independence of the OIG just described
required three years of sustained public work by organized citizens and business leaders, engaging
strongly with both sympathetic elected and appointed officials and vocal opponents.
Act 4: Hiring the Founding Inspector General
Passage of the OIG ordinance set in motion the appointment by the mayor of a seven-member
Ethics Review Board (ERB), with six members nominated by local university presidents. The ERB
is responsible for choosing the inspector general and overseeing the work of the office. It met for
the first time in 2006 and initiated a search for the city’s first inspector general. From a national
applicant pool, the board chose Robert Cerasoli, the former founding inspector general of
Massachusetts.
Inspector General Cerasoli swept into New Orleans like the proverbial whirlwind. He
promptly informed local media, which was keenly interested in the advent of his office and not a
little skeptical about the possibility of its success, that on refusing a city car and gas when he went
to process his paperwork at City Hall, he was told, “But everybody gets a car and gas.” He declined.
Thus began the well-publicized adventures of New Orleans’ founding inspector general. By
patiently building positive relationships with city council members and making himself readily
available to the media and the public, the inspector general became a public favorite and, with
support from city council and civic leaders, was able to obtain approval of an initial annual
operating budget of over $3 million, up from an initially proposed $250,000. He did so by
singlehandedly drafting and winning civil service and city council approval for the roster of jobs
he felt necessary to staff a credible office. For reasons of both symbolism and security, Cerasoli
established the OIG outside City Hall, in the New Orleans Federal Reserve Bank, by far the city’s
most secure building. With fully intended irony and a keen sense of local public interest, the OIG
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announced that the target of his first investigation would be the city’s use of vehicles and fuel. To
no one’s surprise, the resulting report found widespread waste and abuse and made
recommendations to bring the city’s policies in line with recognized practices in the administration
of a city motor pool. (They have been.)
Despite professing support periodically for the establishment of the OIG, Mayor Nagin’s
administration did little to facilitate setting up the newly approved office. In one memorable
instance, the administration took several months to purchase the computers required to set up the
office, after the funds to do so had been fully approved. This failure to support the office at a
critical juncture, whether from incompetence or intent, delayed the inspector general’s attempts to
begin the work of hiring a staff and developing an initial work plan. Subsequent investigations by
the OIG contributed to felony convictions of the mayor and his cronies.
Believing that business as usual in New Orleans city government could and must be
interrupted if the city was to be rebuilt for the benefit of all after the hurricane, citizens and public
officials successfully established the OIG as a nationally recognized method for creating
enforceable standards of transparency and accountability for those holding public office. From that
day forward, the commitment to reform local public institutions has been grounded, symbolically
and pragmatically, in the OIG. That office is the principal lever that many civic and business
leaders and government officials now pull to continue reducing waste and corruption in the public
institutions of our city.
Act 5: Accomplishments of the Office of Inspector General
Since its establishment nearly fifteen years ago, the OIG of the City of New Orleans has
investigated and issued reports on waste and corruption in numerous areas of city government. Its
method is simple: Investigate and report. Sometimes the report is to the public, sometimes to legal
authorities. The latter occurs when possible criminality is identified. Each public report includes
an invited response from the investigated body. Finally, the investigated body is given notice that
its response to the recommendations will be revisited on a specific date and the results made public.
This process continues until the matter is resolved.
A partial sample of OIG investigations includes purchasing, use of city vehicles, sanitation
contracts, collection of hotel-motel taxes, accounts payable and fixed asset control, and private
management of major post-Katrina infrastructure rebuilding projects. Also, it produced major
reports on financial management, drinking water safety, theft by the city’s sewerage and water
board, and deployment of police manpower and management of rape kits. A signal
accomplishment of the OIG is the embedding for years of an investigator at the New Orleans
airport, a place where graft and waste had long existed on steroids. In addition to publicly
unraveling a problematic set of vendor contracts and overseeing the creation of new contracts and
oversight, the OIG oversaw planning for and construction of a new airport. In recognition of that
work, the airport commission received a lower interest rate on major bonds.
The office has also produced numerous public letters calling the attention of the mayor, city
council, chief administrative officer, and others to practices that have left the city vulnerable to
waste and corruption in expense reimbursement, awarding of city contracts, procurement of goods
and services, electronic monitoring of parolees, disadvantaged business enterprises, and proposed
contracts for remodeling the city’s municipal auditorium. The office conducted investigations of
the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, the French Market Corporation, and the city’s crime
surveillance cameras. It published a report detailing $2.5 million wasted annually by the city’s
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traffic and municipal courts. These and other investigations led to increased public scrutiny,
specific recommendations for change, and sometimes criminal indictments.
The range and quality of the OIG’s work belies the attempt to delegitimize the office by
portraying it as an instrument of whites to check black politicians. The OIG is the first effective
force to interrupt the history of waste, fraud, and abuse of power in New Orleans. The OIG has
created a mechanism for transparency that for the first time in the city’s history allows city
administrators, legal authorities, and citizens to hold elected and appointed officials accountable
for their stewardship of public resources. The OIG has done what few could have imagined, and
none had been able to accomplish before the storm: It has created a baseline public expectation
that waste, fraud, and abuse of power by elected or appointed officials are no longer to be laughed
off. It is much more likely to be exposed, with timely and serious consequences for those who risk
misusing public office for personal gain. Waste and corruption can no longer be practiced with
impunity. This is a new thing in three hundred years of New Orleans history.
For the first six months of Act 1, the responses I received even from progressive business and
civic leaders when I raised the possibility of having an inspector general in New Orleans ranged
from an amused shake of the head to “In New Orleans? You must be crazy!” to “Good and evil
are in the soul of New Orleans. If you take away evil, you’ll kill the city.” One prominent local
media figure opined that a functioning inspector general would be the “biggest change in New
Orleans since the Civil War.” Fifteen years after the Government Efficiency and Effectiveness
Committee of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission first put the idea of an inspector general
out there as a possibility, the local citizenry and public officials, the cynics and skeptics, have new
possibilities to consider and the media representative’s words may yet prove to be prescient.

Social Traps and Social Trust: Public Institutions, Economic Opportunity, and
Intergroup Conflict
There is a deep pattern underlying the workings of corruption in public institutions. It has been
called the “social trap.” It occurs when there is insufficient trust to allow members of different
groups to cooperate, even when the interests of all groups would plainly be served if they could
do so.1 Such situations are the result of historical struggles among racial, ethnic, religious, or
socioeconomic groups over freedom, dignity, power, and resources. Racial conflicts are a classic
example of social traps.
Bo Rothstein explains that when a social trap drives intergroup relations, it is not possible to
overcome it at scale by directly building or strengthening voluntary relationships based on shared
interest among members of groups in conflict. No number of better face-to-face relationships will
resolve an intergroup conflict over the basic things that matter. The antidote to social traps is social
trust, which arises only as access to economic opportunity grows for all who are prepared to work
and learn. And that opportunity, in turn, is the product of good public institutions.
A “good public institution” is defined here as one that operates lawfully, fairly, efficiently,
and effectively. On the link between institutions and social trust, Rothstein writes: “The more trust
people have in political and administrative institutions, the more they are inclined to feel social
trust in their fellow human beings, or the reverse: the more people believe that other people can
generally be trusted, the more they trust in social institutions.”2 He adds: “If people cannot trust
that public officials will act according to norms such as impartiality, objectivity, incorruptibility,
and non-discrimination, they cannot trust ‘people in general’ either.”3 Corrupt and wasteful public
institutions do not stop at wasting and stealing public money; they also destroy trust between,
among and within human groups. They fuel social traps.
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The level of social trust required to break through social traps by cooperative intergroup relations
is created indirectly through maintaining good public institutions that make economic opportunity
available fairly. How people in general view the integrity of public officials administering and
enforcing institutional rules shapes how they view the general trustworthiness of their fellow
citizens: “If it proves that I cannot trust the local police, judges, teachers, and doctors, then whom
in this society can I trust?”4 It is a question worth pondering, one that always has answers that
always matter.
The story of the New Orleans OIG details the creation of a public entity constitutionally
mandated to push hard for good public institutions. In the light of the antithetical forces of social
traps and social trust, the OIG appears as a powerful instrument for two critical steps that must be
taken for the well-being of any city.
First, community leaders committed to increasing economic opportunity for all who are
willing to learn and work must see to it that local public institutions that are supported by tax
dollars serve all who are entitled to their protection and services fairly, efficiently, and effectively
through programs such as adult literacy, community policing, workforce preparation and
placement, and re-entry services for former prisoners. Local governments doing such things well
and free of corruption makes businesses and citizens believe that investing in their city’s future
makes sense. It is also true that those who face the biggest economic challenges are the ones who
most need government services, because they cannot provide privately for education, health care,
neighborhood security, and so on. Absent good public institutions, the politics and economics of
any city will degrade into social-trap power struggles among actual and would-be insiders, while
access to opportunity for outsiders continues to diminish. This has been the pattern in New Orleans.
Whatever the particular issue of the moment, the underlying, unchanging purpose of the OIG is to
produce good public institutions. The examples of OIG accomplishments described earlier
illustrate this critical point.
Second, New Orleans leaders committed to creating institutional conditions that promote
expanding economic opportunity for all by establishing the OIG have also and simultaneously put
their city on a path to building social trust among groups caught in social traps. No form or amount
of multiracial or interfaith dialogue or education will add significantly to a city’s reservoir of
intergroup trust as long as corrupt institutions cause some to be assisted and others to be limited in
achieving economic success, not because of their capacities, but because they do or do not belong
to particular groups. Insider dealing corrupts institutions, damages economic development and
opportunity, and heightens racial tensions. Whatever its particular purpose, every good public
institution moves the body politic from traps to trust.
In summary, good public institutions are a direct link to increasing economic opportunity for
all and an indirect link to building social trust among historically divided groups. Public
institutions, economic opportunity, and social trust go together, for better and for worse. The OIG
is a powerful influence now available to strengthen those links in New Orleans. If successful, its
three principal outcomes will be directly reducing waste and corruption and indirectly reducing
racial tension and enhancing economic opportunity for all who are willing to work and learn.
Where to Start?
Social scientists have made a compelling case that economic opportunity, honest and efficient
public institutions, and social trust go together, their findings suggest three differing
recommendations about where to start in order to move the circular relationship among the three
factors in the positive direction.
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Starting with Trust

PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS
WITH
INTEGRITY

ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY

SOCIAL
TRUST

Those who start with social trust believe that if you want to build the public institutions that are
necessary to support the creation of economic opportunity, you should bring together people who
have been divided, by encouraging the formation of groups based on shared hobbies and other
interests, social concerns, geographic proximity, and so on. A civil society rich in “voluntary
associations” provides the social glue that makes it possible for governmental and business
institutions to function properly.5 This approach to building social trust is direct: Members of
historically alienated groups must meet face-to-face in voluntary associations in order to create the
social trust required for good government and economic growth.
Starting with Economic Opportunity

PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS
WITH
INTEGRITY

SOCIAL
TRUST

ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY

Those emphasizing economic opportunity believe that markets left free to function will reward
competence, create a growing pool of economic opportunities, and generate a stronger tax base to
support necessary government services.6 They are convinced that government attempts to create
economic equality by forced redistribution schemes involving taxation of businesses and
individuals or social policies, such as affirmative action, that give advantages to members of some
groups based on ethnicity or gender to make up for past discrimination interfere with and can
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destroy the market’s job-creating power by distorting the dynamics of economic competition and
chasing businesses into jurisdictions with transparent, consistent ground rules applied
evenhandedly to all.7 When local economies flourish, more households build assets, local
governments have the resources to address public concerns, and social trust rises. But when
business owners must “pay to play,” that is, bribe local officials directly with envelopes or
indirectly with campaign contributions in order to get contracts or permits, or when public
decisions are “steered” by nepotism, ethnicity, or political affiliation, the economic base and the
employment opportunities only it can generate, the tax revenues it produces and social trust spiral
downward together.8 From this perspective, public institutions play a limited but crucial role in
economic development: They establish and enforce transparent rules and norms for all, starting
with property rights and equal treatment under the law, without which businesses and individuals
will not invest in local communities and underlying inequalities cannot be addressed.
Starting with the Integrity of Public Institutions

SOCIAL
TRUST

ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY

PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS
WITH
INTEGRITY

Those whose starting point is the integrity of public institutions believe that ensuring that
institutions that are truly universal, that is, that serve all citizens efficiently and effectively (not
wastefully), honestly (limiting corruption and cronyism), and fairly (without regard for ethnicity,
wealth, or connections) is the single most powerful way to create social trust in a community.9
First, a definition: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”10 They consist of formal and informal
rules and mechanisms of enforcement. Institutions are the rules of the game and their enforcement;
individuals and organizations are the players.
When public institutions reduce waste of public resources, diminish corruption, and treat all
entitled to their services equally, they increase social trust indirectly by creating the ground rules
necessary to generate economic opportunity for more people.11 The likelihood that people in
general will trust each other—especially in circumstances where there have been significant ethnic,
religious, or class conflicts and divisions—goes up as members of all groups experience the
reduction of waste, corruption, and discrimination by public institutions, such as planning
commissions, school boards, and city halls. When those institutions functional universally, that is,
efficiently, honestly, and fairly for all, additional belief in “the system” fuels economic opportunity
for all and breeds trust of other people in the community. When and so far as public institutions
fail to meet the standards of universality, legitimate government services and benefits are denied
10
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to taxpayers, economic opportunity is limited and mistrust blocks and fractures relationships
among people, reinforcing histories of division. A community’s public institutions make possible
and limit its economic vitality and opportunity, which in turn affect levels of trust among its
various groups. Public integrity, economic opportunity, and social trust spiral up and down
together.
Contrary to popular local and national opinions, the fundamental problem facing American
cities is not poverty. Nor is it racism.12 Those are symptoms of a deeper social malady. What has
many American cities in steady decline is an underlying deficit of social trust, social traps. New
Orleanians struggle to negotiate with integrity across race and class lines to bring into being a city
that works better and more equitably for all groups. Both locals and outsiders typically misattribute
our social dilemma to racism, the indifference of the wealthy, or pathology in poor black families;
but an intergroup impasse over goals and action is the underlying social trap in which New Orleans
and other American cities continue to be caught.13 This awareness becomes plainer and more
painful as we look to the east and to the west where our sister cities of Atlanta, Houston, and San
Antonio find ways out of this trap and flourish as a result. In the years since Katrina drew an
indelible line in one American city, history has done us the painful service of keeping a bright
public spotlight on our crippling social traps. And while the uniqueness of the Crescent City is
rightly legendary, what plagues our body politic is by no means our challenge alone: The
incapacity of elected, business, and civic leaders to compromise and act across race and class lines
for the common good is the American dilemma.14 The story of one American city is a variation of
the story of all America’s cities.
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